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Given the display of the savage Israeli war on Gaza, the barbaric and genocidal 
violence of Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (and the violent reaction this has prompted 
from the US and its allies), and Libya’s descent into religious and ethnic sectarian 
fighting during the summer and autumn of 2014, one can understand that pessimism 
and doubt have replaced the initial optimism of the Arab revolts. With 
counterrevolutionary forces (such as the Egyptian army) taking back the reins of 
power, radical religious groups redrawing the geopolitical map of the region, and 
constant foreign interventions serving the interests of the US and its allies, there’s 
general disillusionment with the outcome of the Arab revolts, and one could be 
forgiven for asking whether it all was worthwhile. The Syrian carnage and the 
mindless violence of IS have given rise to conspiracy theories from Rabat to Baghdad 
and beyond; depicting the Arab revolutions as a big scam manipulated–if not 
orchestrated–by foreign powers (the US in particular) and their regional allies (like 
Saudi Arabia) to divide the peoples of the region so as to humiliate and weaken them. 
This, in turn, is leading to a growing justification for the re-emergence of corrupt but 
powerful authoritarian leaderships. However, the choice is obviously not between 
sectarian violence on the one hand and strong authoritarian rule (backed by imperialist
forces) on the other. The choice is still, first and foremost, between the will of the 
people and their aspirations and the counterrevolutionary forces that are trying to 
thwart the realization of these aspirations. Whether the Arab revolutions have failed or
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not, is not the most pressing or interesting question to raise. Rather, we need to 
understand how the revolts have deeply challenged the post-World War II order in the 
region, and gauge the emergent conflicts that will shape the future politics of the 
region. The task at hand remains to understand the complex and multifaceted reasons 
for, and consequences of, the uprisings.
Even though there is no consensus on the causes that have triggered the chain 
of events starting with the ousting of Tunisia’s leader Ben Ali in early 2011; most 
observers agree that the dismal economic and social situation of most of the region’s 
people played a crucial role. The two books under review rightly emphasize the need 
to contextualize the revolts in a longer term perspective that does not separate the 
political from the economic realm. Debunking the myth that the Arab revolutions 
were first and foremost about claiming liberal-democratic rights against authoritarian 
rule, both authors show–albeit quite differently–that the structural economic roots of 
the mass mobilizations throughout the region are inextricably linked with the 
authoritarian political orders. Apart from this–and the fact that both authors can be 
labeled as “progressive scholars”–both authors understand the political economy of 
the region differently and thus draw different lessons in explaining the political 
challenges that flow from that understanding.
Hanieh and Heydarian both speak, in the first place, to an academic and well-
informed readership, but their engagement with politics beyond the ivory tower is 
obvious. In recent years both authors have disseminated shorter articles, op-eds and 
blog comments, thereby popularizing and opening up their academic research findings
to a wider audience. Both authors, however, target different publics. As a lecturer at 
Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines, and policy adviser to a dozen national
and international institutions, Heydarian is first and foremost interested in influencing 
international policy makers, publishing his thoughts in a wide variety of outlets 
including al-Jazeera, the Huffington Post and the New York Times. Hanieh, as a senior
lecturer in Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 
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London, wants to offer political and social movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa region a framework of analysis that could inform their strategies and tactics of 
mobilization.
The authors’ critical political economy contrasts with the bulk of academic 
scholarship on the region. The predominant Anglo-Saxon approach has focused on 
what seems to be the pervading feature of Arab politics, that is, the longevity and 
persistence of authoritarian rule. The energy and resources that have been channeled 
to explain the stability of Arab authoritarian politics have led to a misjudging of the 
forces of change in the region. According to Hanieh (p.2-6), this flows from the use of
conventional approaches of the region’s political economy in which the basic 
analytical categories of “state” and “civil society” are used as a template to assert the 
ever-present conflict between “authoritarianism” (located in the state sphere) and the 
forces of the market and political liberalization (located in civil society). Instead, 
Hanieh offers a framework in which capitalism and class constitute crucial pivots of 
analysis. Geographers might find interesting how Hanieh elaborates on the notion of a
“Middle Eastern region” as a region integrated in very specific ways into the 
international economic order. Using a multi-scalar lens, Hanieh convincingly shows 
how imperialism and the internationalization of capital in the region (and especially in
the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council) has deeply transformed its 
economies and become internalized in the class structures of neighboring states.
Both Hanieh and Heydarian criticize the neoliberal policies that several 
countries have implemented since the 1980s, but explain the origins and outcomes of 
these policies in different ways. Hanieh’s work is firmly embedded within the Marxist
political economy tradition, based on a thorough methodology that encompasses both 
a critique of mainstream Middle East studies as well as a critique on capitalism itself. 
Heydarian’s argument–while sharing much with Hanieh on the nature of economic 
reform–is less focused on capitalism as such than on its specific neoliberal form. The 
catchy title of his book is therefore in part a lure as he does not reject capitalism, and 
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advocates, as I will argue later, for a renewed developmental state based on Keynesian
teachings.
The power of Hanieh’s argument resides in his coherent approach combining a
number of key insights. Crucial to his research is an approach that rejects the idea of 
the nation-state being a self-contained political economy that can be studied 
separately from the ways it interacts and intertwines with other spatial scales, namely 
the regional and global. His effort to approach the Arab world “as a region” enables 
him to map the shifting hierarchies within an integrated entity that shapes national 
social formations and, in turn, interacts dialectically with forces at the global scale. By
doing so, Hanieh can probe the specific nature, and describe the main features, of 
capitalism in the region, including the ways in which the Middle East has been 
integrated into the world market while remaining a zone of global rivalries and 
regional turmoil. For Hanieh, authoritarian rule–that is so prevalent in the region–is 
not attributable to “bad governance” or “wrong policies” but is rather the functional 
outcome of capitalism itself in the region. Heyderian does not follow this structural 
analysis, focusing instead on the agential power of the elites: “the reforms were off-
balance and one-sided, strengthening the autocrats, at least in the short run, at the 
expense of genuine economic development” (p.67). 
While Heydarian acknowledges that the failure of Arab nationalism and its 
developmental promises is linked to the region’s interaction with the global system 
(p.57), he nevertheless lays the blame for the “ocean of broken vows” (p.36) upon 
failing leadership and bad governance. Arab nationalism led to a paternalistic 
“Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ state stretching its long arms deep into all aspects of 
society” (p.44) and silencing the citizenry by providing social welfare in return for 
political passivity. Hanieh’s structural, materialist analysis rejects personal faults or 
lopsided policies as a ground for explanation. He demonstrates how Arab nationalism,
even in its most radical phase, while borrowing socialist rhetoric upheld an anti-class 
perspective as evidenced by the repression of independent labor movements and 
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unions. In short, according to Hanieh, “Arab nationalist regimes acted primarily to 
strengthen capitalism and an emerging, state-linked capitalist class” (p.26). The 
negotiation of Cold War rivalries offered the Arab nationalist regimes, for a short 
period of time, an opportunity to “square the contradictions stemming from its pro-
capital orientation and its apparent confrontations with imperialism” (p.25). Hanieh 
perhaps underestimates the diverse trajectories of different states in the region in 
dealing with the social and class question. In some countries, like Tunisia and Egypt 
for example, the state enjoyed a status of relative autonomy vis-à-vis the capitalist 
classes. These states had some rational-legal bureaucratic dimension rendering them 
less dependent on the direct interests of the bourgeoisie and offering more 
possibilities for reform. By critically appropriating Max Weber’s concept of 
(neo-)patrimonailism, as Gilbert Achcar (2013) does in his The People Want, a more 
subtle analysis of rentier capitalism, crony capitalism, and nepotism (in relation to 
sectarianism and ethnicity) could have been undertaken to explore the differences 
between the countries of the region.
Hanieh argues that when the strategy of consolidating local capitalism proved 
ultimately unsuccessful and most of the Arab states turned to neoliberal economic 
policies, the integration of the Arab economies into the global market paradoxically 
strengthened the development of local capitalist classes. The irony was that this did 
not occur through a break with imperialism but rather through the integration of that 
class into the circuits of global capital accumulation, leading to less independence as 
foreign powers were able to “lock certain social forces within the Middle East into a 
framework of shared interests opposed to those of the vast majority” (p. 27).
Heydarian completely bypasses the question of imperialism. While he 
acknowledges the myriad military conflicts throughout the region, and the impact of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, he reduces the question of imperialism to it. Instead, 
Hanieh offers a more elaborated analysis of imperialism by focusing on the political, 
military and economic means used by Western powers and their allies in the Gulf to 
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subordinate the region’s political economy to the forms required by the capitalist 
system. Both Heydarian and Hanieh offer empirical evidence of the specific 
mechanisms that were put in place through the introduction of neoliberal policies such
as labor market deregulation, privatization, the cutting of subsidies for consumer 
goods, free trade agreements, and land tenure reforms in the agricultural sector. Both 
also describe the depressing effects these policies had on the Arab region, such as 
catastrophically high rates of youth unemployment (aggravated by a demographic 
explosion), growing working class poverty, the “squeezing” of the middle classes, and
skyrocketing corruption, but explain these effects very differently. Heydarian suggests
that since autocrats feared the impact of genuine economic reform on their systems of 
patronage, they consciously put in place predatory forms of privatization leading to 
crony capitalism–the self-enrichment of state-linked elites at the expense of the 
majority of people. While acknowledging the role played by “bad policies” and 
“greedy rulers”, according to Hanieh the effects of neoliberal reform should be seen 
as natural products of the uneven development and forms of exploitation tied to the 
integration of the region in the global economy.
The Arab uprisings and revolutions are, thus, not only a cry for more political 
freedoms but also reflect a yearning for more economic development and 
redistributive justice. Heydarian’s plea for the creation of social-democratic states by 
representative elected governments redressing the great divide between elites and the 
majority of the populations through policies that overcome the inherent vulnerabilities
of markets sounds like a good idea but falls short on practical implementation. With 
authoritarian rule re-establishing itself throughout the region, it is hard to see how a 
Keynesian developmental state could thrive. Ultimately, as Hanieh argues, a 
developmentalist state would, at best, resolve only temporarily issues of development.
Hanieh puts no hope in a “patriotic bourgeoisie” acting in the interest of the majority 
as he considers this class as a part of the problem of stalled economic development 
and reform. Fundamental change in the region, he argues, can only come about when 
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the issue of capitalism and its imperial form is confronted head-on through social 
struggle. While Hanieh admits that a pan-regional struggle seems like a utopian 
vision, he still puts his hopes in the promise of revolt. However, the Marxist political 
economy approach obfuscates in part a focus on the ways in which social movements 
and other groups have, over the course of recent decades, tried to resist authoritarian 
rule. Charles Tripp’s (2013) The Power and the People, for example, could 
complement Hanieh’s insights, as it explores the processes of resistance by various 
people in their struggle with dominant power and highlights the dialectic between 
power and resistance.
In the face of ongoing problems throughout the region, it is hard to image how
a social revolt can muster the traction and power needed for meaningful change. The 
mass mobilizations for emancipation that we’ve witnessed since 2011 inspired many 
citizens in the Middle East–and beyond–as long as they confronted repressive 
authoritarian rule. Today’s predicament for the peoples of the region stems from the 
fact that they face multiple forms of repression, bigotry and intolerance. When 
confronted with the violence of authoritarian leaders holding on to power (from Syria 
to Saudi Arabia), IS’s abject barbarism cloaked as divine mission, and, lest we forget, 
the grand imperial designs of foreign powers, the peoples of the region have no other 
option but to pick their battles. Peace, security and political freedom will most 
certainly rise to the top of the agenda. But without any form of redistributive justice 
and sustained development, these goals will remain illusory. If we see revolution, 
following Rosa Luxemburg and looking at the histories of resistance, organization and
state repression, as an ongoing, multifaceted process, instead of a singular event (see 
Zemni et al. 2013), then the peoples of the region have proved that political 
sovereignty and agency–in the face of all that adversity–lies ultimately with “the 
people”. Even if the Arab revolts have not realized the immediate political and social 
emancipation of the masses from domination and exploitation, they have nevertheless 
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developed forms of organization and consciousness which provide the basis for new 
struggles in the (near?) future.
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